DePaul University
From the SelectedWorks of M. Cherif Bassiouni

1971

Self-Determination and the
Palestinians
M. Bassiouni, DePaul University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/m-bassiouni/94/

+(,121/,1(
Citation:
M. C. Bassiouni, Self-Determination and the
Palestinians, 65 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 31, 39
(1971)
Provided by:
Rinn Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Nov 7 16:02:10 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
your smartphone or tablet device

SECOND SESSION

Thursday, April 29, 1971, at 2:15 p.m.
Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict
The session convened at 2:15 o'clock p.m. in the Presidential Ballroom
of the Statler-Hilton Hotel, Ambassador Charles W. Yost, former United
States representative to the United Nations, now of Columbia University,
presiding. Ambassador Yost introduced the speakers, Professor M. Cherif
Bassiouni of DePaul University, and Professor Leslie C. Green of the
University of Alberta.
"SELF-DETERMINATION" AND THE PALESTINIANS
By M. C. Bassiouni *
'SELF-DmwEu~mqATnoN" AS A GENERAL PP NCIPLE OF INENATIONAL
LAW: HIsTOmcAL. EvOLUnON AmD RECOGNMON
The right of "self-determination" is the product of an evolutionary process which does not owe its existence to the grace of history, but developed
in spite of it. Its manifestations were varied and diverse. At times, it
was an exercise of community behavioral auto-determination, as in the
case of the Greek Polis and the city-state, soon to evolve, in a different
way with the propagation of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The focus
then was on a widening of the individual moral choice, but which, when
exercised collectively, was "self-determination." The religious wars between Christian sects were predicated on a right of "self-determination"
as recorded in such early treaties as the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).
The separation of Church and State and the emergence of doctrines of
political freedom of choice resulted in writings and declarations concerning the rights of man. They caused the ideological struggle to move
gradually from the religious to the political sphere, even though the distinction is immaterial in this context.
The successive wave of human thought and events which advanced the
notion of collective "self-determination" started amidst theories of political
freedom and socio-economic justice. The emergence of choice of government doctrines and popular representation in the decision-making process
of states was but the start, soon to be followed by notions of popular
representation and constitutional control of the organs of power. All of
these remained in the sphere of individual freedom of choice and did not
rise to the level of the right of "self-determination." It was not until the
"people" had state-making power that the right of "self-determination"
was manifest. Not every group, however, constitutes a "people": "Only
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that group of individuals who feel commonly bound by certain factors of
some permanency, and whose collective behavior reveals that they share
certain value-oriented goals which they are desirous of implementing."
These "commonly binding factors of some permanency" have not always been the same, but any known community was invariably predicated
on any one or a combination of the following factors: religion, race, culture, language and political ideology. Nationalism invariably consisted
of a combination of these factors, but nations seldom consist of a cohesive group linked by identical factors. Whenever sufficient commonly
binding factors gave rise to a nationalistic concept, the latter in turn generated its own "common binding factors." The grouping of diverse "collectivities" into a single political entity, i.e., a state, presupposes the
existence of "socio-economic-political structures capable of allowing the
co-existing pursuit of whatever ideological differences are combined under
that umbrella."
The advent of the League of Nations saw the application of the principle of "self-determination" to "nationalities" as a question of minorities'
rights-a theme which the United Nations subsequently pursued as one
of human rights. History reveals, however, that, whether religious or political, "self-determination" is the framework of a value-oriented inquiry.
Unfuilled declarations on "self-determination" were numerous between
1914 and 1945. The notion was used as a pretext for Germany to invade
Czechoslovakia and as a basis for the victorious allies to decide the fate
of Europe in the Declarations of Yalta and Potsdam. "Self-determination"
was announced in 1945 as a policy of the United States in keeping with
the Wilson Doctrine and proclaimed to be a policy principle of many a
nation, among which were Western European countries that continued
their colonial policies and practices undaunted by this proclaimed right.
It was stated as an objective of NATO by its member states and heralded
at San Francisco, to be finally enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
Indeed, Articles 1(2) and 55 of the Charter state it explicitly, while Chapters XI, XII, and XIII, on non-self-governing territories and the trusteeship system, embody it in spirit, and their provisions designated inter alia
to attain that goal. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights explicitly states: "All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of the right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development . . . [and]
freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources." All of which ultimately evidences the recognition attained by this principle, even though
it is still not undisputed.
History clearly reveals a consistent trend of still growing acceptance
by the common morality of mankind of "self-determination" as a general
principle of international law. This is clearly evidenced by the recognition given thereto in treaties, declarations, public pronouncements by
state officials, writings of scholars and its embodiment in the United Nations Charter. The actual practice of states, particularly colonial and
neo-colonial states, does not demonstrate that the right, though recog-

nized in principle, has been applied voluntarily or consistently. It is
certainly conceded that "self-determination" is not part of customary international law, since the custom and usage of member states of the world
community do not evidence it by their practice. If that were the case,
however, and "self-determination" were practiced as a customary matter,
the question of its existence would be moot in light of the challenges
it still meets.
The prolific history of General Assembly resolutions has certainly exhibited a recurring and confirmed adherence to the principle by those
states who voted for these resolutions. Considering, therefore, the law
and practice of the United Nations and the previous history of "self-determination," as a right to exercise collective behavioral freedom of choice,
the conclusion is warranted that it is a general principle of international
law recognized by the world community even though not always applied.
Nature of the Right
"Self-determination" is a catch-all concept which exists as a principle,
develops into a right under certain circumstances,unfolds as a process and
results in a remedy. As an abstract principle it can be enunciated without reference to a specific context; as a right it is operative only in a
relative context, and as a remedy, its equitable application is limited by
the rights of others and the potential injuries it may inflict as weighed
againstthe potential benefits it may generate.
"Self-determination" becomes a right whenever: a given collectivity
is prevented or seriously impeded from freely adhering to or exercising its values, beliefs and practices on the indigenous territory
which they inhabit (or from which have been removed) by another
collectivity by coercive means.
The inarticulate premise of that right is the existence of conflicting valueoriented beliefs and practices of two (or more) collectivities on a given
territory where the "socio-economic-political structures do not permit the
relatively unimpeded co-existing pursuit" of these divergent beliefs and
practices.
The right of self-determination is, therefore, born out of conflict between
two collectivities who have opposing ideological contentions and the implication is that, whenever such a conflict arises but is not channeled
through "structures permitting their relatively unimpeded co-existing pursuit" on that territory, then "self-determination" becomes: (a) the right
relied upon by the oppressed group, and (b) the resolutory norm which
grants the non-dominant party the choice of an uncoerced determination.
A cursory review of the types of issues in which the right was invoked
reveals that it was claimed as a basis for the following: as a right to internal revolution-as grounds for cessation-as a claim for unification of
peoples-as a claim for unification of people and territory-as a claim for
choice of state affiliation-as minorities' rights-as means for acquisition
of territory-as a human right. Whatever the claim relied upon, there
are invariably two co-existing interrelated factors: people and territory.

A central question remains to be answered with respect to the nature
of such a right: Is it a peoples' right or is it a territorial right exercisable
by those within its confines? In the abstract, people determine their goals
regardless of geographic limitations; however, realistically, it is exercisable
only when it can be actuated within a given territory susceptible of acquiring the characteristics of sovereignty which is a prerequisite for acquiring membership in the community of nations.
Palestine and the Palestinians:A People and Its Territory *
The area known as Palestine is bordered by the Mediterranean on the
east, the Jordan River on the west, the Golan Mountains and the Sea of
Galilee on the north, and the Negev and Sinai Deserts on the south. The
Palestinians are descendants of Abraham, Semites by race, who have continuously inhabited that same area known as Palestine since time immemorial. Since 1948, after the creation of the state of Israel on that
territory, they are living in forced exile.
Ever since 634, Semitic Arabs incorporated that region in the Islamic
nation after defeating the Roman occupiers who in 70 A.D. had expelled
the Jews. Few Jews had remained on that land since the Diaspora, but
not all the inhabitants were Jews and not all Jews left Palestine. When
the Arabs drove the Romans out of Palestine, they rescinded the decree
of banishment from Jerusalem, but few Jews returned until the nineteenth
century.
The territory and population of Palestine had always remained an identifiable entity from either the Roman Empire, the Islamic nation, or the
Turkish Ottoman Empire. When the Turks were driven out of Palestine
during World War I by Arab and British forces, England established, with
the help of the League of Nations, a colonial regime in Palestine. The
mandate system, even considering that it was a colonial device, spoke of
the "provisionally independent state of Palestine," thus further underlining
the identifiable character of the territory and its inhabitants. The mandate system was predicated on the existence of a Palestinian entity which,
under the mandatory's administration, was to acquire complete independence. The administration of Palestine under the mandate reinforced that
fact through the establishment of legislative, executive and judicial bodies.
Palestine had a flag, its nationals carried passports recognized abroad. In
effect, with the exception of foreign affairs and subject to the internal
limitations imposed by Great Britain which exercised it in the same manner as it had in Egypt or India, Palestine had most of the characteristics
of a state.
After 1947-48, the Palestinians, however, ceased to be a "people" and
The ideas and figures presented in this section have been introduced in Basslouni,
"The 'Middle East': The Misunderstood Conflict," 19 Kansas Law Rev. 373 (1971).
See also, Bassiouni and Fisher, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict-Real and Apparent Issues:
An Insight into its Future from the Lessons of the Past," 44 St. John's Law Rev. 399
(1970); Bassiouni, "Some Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in The Arab
Israeli Confrontation of June 1967 (ed. I. ABU-Lughod, 1970); idem, "The MiddleEast in Transition: From War to War, A Proposed Solution," 4 Int. Law 379 (1970).
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became refugees just as Palestine ceased to exist as an identifiable region.
Between 1948 and 1969, Palestinians were almost uniformly treated as
'refugees." Even the United Nations in its oft-reaffirmed resolution of
1948 (Res. 194) granting the "refugees" a right to return to their former
homeland and to compensation for their lost property never admitted to
the reality that these refugees constitute a "people."
As further evidence of the continued misunderstanding of the United
Nations' perception of the nature of the problem is Resolution 242 of
November, 1967, wherein the Security Council referring to the Palestinians
stated: "2. Affirms further the necessity ... (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem... ." [Emphasis added.] The Palestinian
people rated one line and the dignified label of "refugee problem." It
was not until December, 1969, that a General Assembly resolution finally
recognized for the first time the Palestinian people as a fact and spoke of
the "inalienablerights of the Palestinianpeople."I
Ta DEa OGmPmc CoNTExT OF T E RicBrr OF SELF-DETmuvINATION
IN PALEsTNE AND =a UNrrED NATioNs
At the time Lord Balfour responded to a letter from Baron Rothschild in
1917, the population of Palestine was approximately 90 percent non-Jewish.
The Balfour Declaration, mindful of the Arab character of Palestine, promised to facilitate the establishment of a "National Jewish Homeland in
Palestine" [emphasis added] to Jews willing to immigrate there, but sought
to safeguard the rights of the Arabs and did so in these terms:
It being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country.
A Jewish national home was contemplated then by all parties concerned as the establishment of a Jewish minority, endowed with the right
to pursue its religious and cultural heritage in freedom and peace. The
outcome was to be quite different. Immigration quotas were imposed
by the colonial Power (Great Britain), then increased by political pressure from Zionists and sympathizers as well as anti-Semites who saw in
the contemplated "National Jewish Homeland" a way to rid themselves
of Jewish minorities. Great Britain never entertained the notion that
Jewish immigration could be allowed against the will of the Arab inhabitants, and when it reached such proportions as to change the Arab character of Palestine it declared in 1939 that the entire population ratio was to
be kept at the level it had reached of one third Jewish and two thirds nonJewish Arabs. By 1947, after an onslaught of post-World-War-II illegal immigration, the Jewish population was estimated at about 700,000 to an estimated 900,000 non-Jewish Arabs. In some twenty-five years, Arabs who
had constituted 90 percent of the people of Palestine became barely some
55 percent, even though they still owned over 80 percent of the land and
I Res. 2535 (XXIV), U.N. General Assembly, 24th Sess., Official Records, Supp.
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most of its commerce and industry. Arab sources consider, however, these
estimates to be inflated.
Consider two factors: (1) the demographic transformation was imposed
by a foreign colonial Power, Great Britain, and abused by illegal immigration, and (2) the process of determining the will of the "people' was
based on an estimated head count of those who were physically present
in Palestine without distinction as to the juridical status of those persons
(who could have been immigrants, deportable aliens, tourists, foreign
citizens and nationals). Notwithstanding these two factors, the United
Nations decreed the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab
state. The Jewish state was given approximately 56 percent of the territory of Palestine, soon to be enlarged after the 1948 war to include another
23 percent of Palestine (of that portion of Palestine which the Partition
Plan had allotted to the contemplated Palestinian Arab State).
The United Nations considered in the formulation of the Partition Plan
two factors: (a) The inhabitants of Palestine could no longer coexist in
peace; (b) There was roughly a 55 percent to 45 percent ratio between
Jews and non-Jews in Palestine. On this basis, the United Nations could
be said to have adhered to some form of self-determination when it imposed its Solomonian justice of splitting the territory roughly in two halves
for what in its judgment represented approximately an equal number of persons who belonged to the two opposing collectivities. The United Nations
further added the subsequent caveat of the right of the Palestinians to
return in peace to where they had lived (if it had become part of the
territory allotted the Jewish state), if they desired, and in any event to be
compensated for their property.
The fallacy in that approach to the right of self-determination lies in
that not all individuals or collectivities have a right of self-determination
on any territory of their choice; only those people who have a legitimate
right to a given territory can exercise it on that same territory. The right
of self-determination accrues to a given people on a given territory with
which they have a legitimate "link" and upon which their future political
expectations can be realized. Therefore, some legitimate criteria for the
determination of those who constitute this group called "people" and their
relationship to the territory must be established. The test proposed is
the existence of a "link" or "rational nexus" between the people and the
territory, and this can be ascertained by a criterion of nationality (in
applicable cases).
It is estimated that over one half of the 700,000 persons of the Jewish
faith present in Palestine in 1947 who were estimated to constitute some
45 percent of the entire population of Palestine were not Palestinian nationals. Palestinian nationality did exist and was so recorded on official
documents, including passports which were issued only to nationals. Assuming the validity of the estimate that one half of that group or approximately 350,000 were Palestinian nationals, then approximately one third
of the entire population dictated the outcome of the future of Palestine
against the express will of two thirds of the remaining nationals, which
vitiates the argument that the partition was predicated on a modicum of

self-determination. This assertion is predicated, however, on the choice
of a nationality criterion for the exercise of the right of self-determination
and a majoritarian rule as the valid process.
The partition, in effect, foreclosed the Palestinians' right of self-determination by including in the category of "people" eligible to exercise it,
persons who did not qualify under the nationality criterion. This criterion is obviously not the only one which could be devised, but certainly
physical presence alone would not suffice either. It is advanced that a
"right" of self-determination for the Israelis exists and is equal in dignity
to the Palestinians' "right." This also presupposes that equal "rights"
spring from equally legitimate sources. The Palestinians' claim that they
are a "people" linked to that territory upon which they are entitled to
exercise their right of self-determination, but that people of the Jewish
faith cannot make an equally strong claim. Israel rather argues historical
legitimacy, but in fact seeks to trade its military supremacy for recognition by treaty which would give it a color of legitimacy by condonation
and foreclose any subsequent Palestinian claims predicated on "self-determination" at the state-making stage of its own creation. That is why the
Palestinians claim that the exercise of the right of "self-determination" in
Palestine is restricted to the population of Palestine prior to its radical
demographic transformation between 1922 and 1947. They maintain that
the mandate system and its successor, the trusteeship system of the United
Nations, did not envision or permit a trust territory to be so administered
by a trustee as to allow an imposed or forceful demographic transformation designed to alter the indigenous character of that territory and remove its original inhabitants. For the United Nations to act on the basis
of imposed conditions (unauthorized foreign immigration) is in manifest
derogation of its obligations to the original indigenous population and
their legitimate rights to the protection of which it is pledged as a "sacred
trust of civilization."
The right of self-determination in this case should have been considered
by the General Assembly when it decided on partition to be in accordance
with legitimate criteria determined by the rights and obligations arising
out of the trusteeship system and its stated purposes to which it was
morally and legally bound. That, it did not do. But in 1970, recognizing
the existence of the Palestinian peoples' right to self-determination, it
passed the following resolution.
Recognizing that the problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees has
arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter
of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Recalling its resolution 2535B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, in
which it reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine,
Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter of the United
Nations and more recently affinned in the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation2
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
2

Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. General Assembly, 25th Sess., Official Records, Supp.

No. 40 (A/8013), p. 30.

1. Recognizes that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal
rights and self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations;
2. Declares that full respect for the inalienable rights of the people
of Palestine is an indispensable element
3 in the establishment of a
just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
APPLICATION OF THE RIcHr OF SELF-DETErMINATION TO THE
PALEsTINIANS

AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

"PtEope" AND

"TmEuR'roY"

The right of self-determination as stated above presupposes the existence of two interrelated factors: people and territory. The Palestinians
are no longer physically present on the territory on which they claim they
once had a right of self-determination. The two elements of territory and
population have been severed by the coercive displacement of the Palestinian population from that territory. Does that fact extinguish the right?
It must be noted that what is claimed by the Palestinians is not a right
of "self-determination" arising only in the present or after their displacement in 1948 from Palestine, but a right which existed at the time the
mandate was established and never terminated. The main tenet of this
position is that legitimate rights such as "self-determination" are not extinguishable by the coercive displacement (or preventing the return) of
the "people" from the "territory" after the right has accrued to this very
"people" on that very territory.
This proposition, therefore, rejects a post-1948 right of self-determination which would link the Palestinian people to territory other than that
which Israel carved out of original Palestine. This is the position of the
Palestine Liberation Organization which was expressed in Article 6 of
the 1968 Palestinian National Covenant: "Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians."
1923 was chosen as the cut-off year by the P.L.O., because in their
opinion it is the commencement of the Zionist invasion. That cut-off date
is, however, debatable since Palestinian Arab representatives agreed in
the ensuing years to an immigration quota which allowed for the lawful
entry of many European Jews.
The population of Palestine, which under this argument would constitute the "Palestinian people" entitled to the exercise of "self-determination," is estimated to be one third Jewish and all that must be taken into
account. Assuming the validity of the proposition that one third of the
population consisted of Jews eligible to choose partition, the Partition
Plan as it relates to territorial apportionment is also defenseless, as it gave
the Jewish state 56 percent of the territory of Palestine.
What, then, is the remedy for a "people" whose right of "self-deteruination" was violated? A right to return-this was indeed established
by United Nations General Assembly resolution but never enforced.

8 Res. 2672 C (XXV),

ibid., p. 4, Dec. 8, 1970.

CONCLUSION

The Palestinians are a people whose right of "self-determination" has
been violated. The Palestine Liberation Organization proposes a political
solution: The establishment in Palestine of a secular, democratic, progres8ive society without distinction or discrimination as between Jews, Christians, and Muslims. This is rejected by Israel, which continues to be
essentially a creature of world Zionism, designed to maintain its exclusivist
character for the alleged benefit of world Jewry. The two diverse collectivities (Jewish and non-Jewish) maintain opposing and conflicting ideologies and are not likely to be reconciled without the transformation of the
"socio-economic-political structures" of Israel "to allow for the peaceful
coexisting pursuit" of the views of these two collectivities. Interestingly
enough, all of Palestine and half of the Palestinian people are now under
Israeli control. If Israel were not to return the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan and Egypt and the Palestinians living thereon would remain on these
territories, their original claim to "self-determination" would end. Only
two issues would remain pending: (1) the right of return for the balance
of the Palestinians, and (2) guarantees of implementing human rights
available under international law to the Palestinians residing in IsraelPalestine.
Most writers and political pundits assume that the West Bank and
Gaza must or will be returned to Jordan and Egypt and some speak of a
separate Palestinian state on these territories. Considering that the Palestinians are not parties to the Jarring talks and that they are not parties to
Resolution 242, only Jordan and Egypt can be the recipients of these
territories if and when they are to be returned by Israel. Several worthwhile plans have been submitted and discussed concerning the establishment of a Palestinian state, an Israeli-Palestinian commonwealth as proposed by Professor Gottlieb, or a Sinai-Gaza trusteeship by Professor Reisman. These proposals ignore the reality that Israel controls these territories and will relinquish them in whole or in part only to states, Egypt
and Jordan, in exchange for whatever quid pro quo they may secure.
Israel will not create a Palestinian state, and it is my estimate that neither
will Jordan or Egypt. That leaves the Palestinians themselves, who are
not, in my opinion, in a position nor are they willing to establish a state
on either or both of the territories in question. The next best thing to
a protracted guerrilla war may well be if Israel would not return the West
Bank and Gaza and if the United Nations would cause Israel to return the
remainder of the Palestinians, Israel would then become a pluralistic
society, and, with equal rights in this pluralistic society to all, Jews and
non-Jews, the present conflict would be resolved.
The "right of self-determination" would be implemented by a return
of all Palestinians to what was their homeland. The only issue would be
whether Israel would establish a democratic pluralistic society.
Hope more than realism leads me to assert that even if Palestinians
would not at first be equal to Israeli Jews, it would be a matter of time

